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* Comments and Casenotes
A QUERY ABOUT THE NEW MARRIAGE AGE LAW
Chapter 728 of the Maryland Laws of 19391 purports
to set the minimum ages for marriage at 16 for females
and 18 for males. The statute does not make it clear, how-
ever, whether its effect is to make marriages below those
ages void (or perhaps voidable) on the one hand, or, on
the other hand, effectual and valid even though forbidden
and criminal.
The salient portion2 of the statute reads:
"7. It shall be unlawful within this State for any
female below the age of sixteen years or any male
below the age of eighteen years to marry, or for a par-
ent to permit any such female or male to marry, ex-
cept on the certificate of a licensed physician, which
shall be presented with the application for the mar-
riage license, to the effect that the girl' is pregnant,
or for any female between the ages of 16 and 18 years,
or for any male under the age of twenty-one years, to
marry unless the parent or guardian of such male or
female, in person or by signed affidavit, assent thereto,
and, in the case of a female, swear or affirm that she is
over the age of sixteen years, and in the case of a male,
swear or affirm that he is over the 'age of eighteen
years."
1 Md. Laws 1939, Ch. 728, repealing Md. Code, Art. 27, Sec. 363, amend-
ing Md. Code, Art. 62, Sec. 7, and adding Md. Code, Art. 62, Sees. 7A
and 7B.
' The other sections (Md. Code, Art. 62, Sees. 7A and 7B) provide that
the license issuing clerk or the witnesses at a Quaker ceremony shall
demand the assent and statement required by Section 7 and shall incor-
porate same into the record, except for the certificate of pregnancy; and
also provide criminal penalties involving a fine of from $25 to $250, and
punishment as for perjury for making false statements to procure a
license or ceremony. The new statute also repeals Md. Code, Art. 27,
Sec. 363, which had made punishable a minister's knowingly marrying a.
male under 21 or a female under 16 without consent of parent or guardian.
This statute was already largely obsolete under the existing marriage
license statute, Md. Code, Art. 62, Sec. 7 (now amended by the statute
under discussion) which required consent of parents or guardian before
a license should issue for the marriage of a male under 21 or a female
under 18.
The word "girl" in Section 7 raises a further query. If it refers only
to a female under 16, then the exception for pregnancy is one-sided and
makes no provision for an adult woman who is pregnant by a male under
18. Were it intended to provide for the latter situation, it would have
been better to have used "female." It would seem just as desirable to
provide for this situation, but to do so under the statute may require
some word-juggling.
MARRIAGE AGE
Prior to this statute the Maryland law as to age for
marriage was essentially this: Under the common law,4
if either spouse was under the age of seven, the marriage
was totally void. If the female was between seven and
twelve, or if the male was between seven and fourteen, the
marriage was voidable by either, and subject to ratifica-
tion 5 when the under-age spouse reached 12 or 14 as the
case might be.
An earlier Maryland statute6 (incorporated with more
stringent language into the act of 1939) provided that no
marriage license should issue where the female was under
18 or the male under 21 without the consent of parents or
guardian of the under-age party. Under that statute, as
under the 1939 act now being discussed the problem arose
whether a marriage in violation of it was void or voidable
on the one hand, or, on the other hand, valid and effectual
even though criminal and forbidden.
While no Maryland case ever had so ruled, yet the
proper conclusion apparently was that the latter answer
was the correct one, and it was so suggested in two earlier
treatments of the problem in this REviwE. 7  It was argued
that if a person under age for parental consent (though
over 12 or 14) actually was married by a religious' cere-
mony in Maryland (either because the minister criminally
married them without a license, or because a license had
wrongfully been procured by perjury as to age, forgery
of consent, or connivance of issuing clerk) the marriage
was valid and not capable of being annulled or collaterally
attacked for that reason aloneY Analogies from the rule
'There is no Maryland case squarely ruling on marriage age. On the
common law rule, see Long, Domestic Relations (3rd Ed.), Sec. 27. See
conflicting dicta in the dissenting opinion in Lurz v. Lurz, 170 Md. 428, 436-9,
134 A. 906, 185 A. 676 (1936), noted (1937), 1 Md. L. Rev. 348, 353-4.
For a dictum on ratification of infant marriages, with no mention
of the appropriate ages, see Jones v. Jones, 36 Md. 447, 456, 11 Am. Rep.
505 (1872).
0 Md. Code, Art. 62, Sec. 7 (now amended by the statute under dis-
cussion).
INote, Annulment of Marriage for Duress where Pre-Marital Relations
Have Occurred (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 348, 353-354, noting Lurz v. Lurz, supra
n. 4; and an article, Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland
and their Annulment (1938), 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 233-235.
Under Maryland law, the only way in which a marriage may he
performed is by religious ceremony. See the article cited, supra n. 7, 2
Md. L. Rev. 211, 220-224.
' See the article cited, supra n. 7, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 234-235, to the
effect that annulments have been granted (in uncontested cases) where
the only impediment was lack of parental consent, and in appealed cases
where, in addition to that factor, other clearly recognized grounds for
annulment were spelled out.
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in other states, ° the Maryland rule that the license require-
ment is only directory," and the fact that the reported
Maryland cases" involving such marriages had gone off on
other impediments to marriage all served to indicate this.
All of which poses the question: Has the 1939 statute
entirely superseded the common law, discarded the 12-14
ages, and raised the age for total voidness from 7 to 16-18;
or, on the other hand, has it preserved the 7 and 12-14
limits, and merely added to the 18-21 limits for parental
consent another in terrorem proviso at the 16-18 level which
attempts to prevent persons below those ages from getting
married, without affecting the validity of the marriage if
it has happened?
One thing seems certain-the same answer must now
be given for the effect both of the new 16-18 years limits
and the 18-21 ages for parental consent (as amended by
the new statute). For whereas the earlier 18-21 year stat-
ute for parental consent had merely said "no license shall
issue", the 1939 statute says "it shall be unlawful . . . to
marry . . ." both for the new purported minimum ages
of 16-18 and, with respect to lack of parental consent, for
marriages between those ages and 18-21.
It is this latter fact which suggests that the proper
interpretation of the new statute may be that a marriage
in violation of it (whether one under 16-18 or one between
those ages and 18-21 without parental consent) is not a
valid one. "It shall be unlawful" is capable of being in-
terpreted as indicating a legislative intent to make the
forbidden marriages not only criminal but also null and
void. This is certainly stronger language in that direction
10 Madden, Domestic Relations, 65; Payne v. Payne, 295 Fed. 970 (Ct.
of App. of D. C. 1924). Consider also a Maryland analogy in Jones v.
Jones, 45 Md. 144, 159 (1876), to the effect that the (now obsolete) crime
of a minister's marrying slaves without the master's consent did not
render the marriage void.
11 Feehley v. Feehley, 129 Md. 565, 99 A. 663, L. R. A. 1917C, 1017
(1916) discussed in the article cited, 8upra n. 7, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 221-224.12 In Montgomery v. U'Nertle, 143 Md. 200, 122 A. 357 (1923), both the
parties were under the age for parental consent, but no mention of the
impediment of non-age was made, and the annulment was granted for
"fraud and deceit" on the basis of intoxication. This case is discussed
in the article cited, supra n. 7, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 234, 244. In Corder v.
Corder, 141 Md. 114, 117 A. 119 (1922), both the parties were under the
ages for parental consent, but the annulment was granted for fraud, and,
so it happened, for a fraudulent representation by the husband as to
their being old enough to obtain a license in Maryland. This case is dis-
cussed in the article cited, 8upra n. 7, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 234-235, 245-246.
Obviously, if non-age alone were a sufficient ground for annulment, it
would not have been necessary to have gone to such pains to spell out
intoxication and fraud, respectively, on the conflicting facts of those cases.
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than the earlier "no such license shall issue" in the orig-
inal version of the 18-21 rule for parental consent.
On the other hand, there are plausible arguments that
the effect of the new statute is the same as was earlier the
rule under the original 18-21 law for parental consent
(marriage valid if it happens, although parties guilty of
crime). The specific provision for criminal penalties,"
without any specific answer to the problem now under dis-
cussion suggests that the legislature meant only criminal
consequences. The fact that "it shall be unlawful" ap-
plies (in the same sentence) both to the parties' engaging
in a ceremony and their parents' permitting it can be
argued to show that the effect is only in terrorem. The
parents have no problem of status. Furthermore, that
the statute only applies to marriages happening "within
this state" shows that it was intended to prevent cere-
monies rather than affect validity.
A further query arises: If it be held that the new stat-
ute does go to the validity of the marriages in violation of
it, how will it affect them? Will it make them totally void
and subject to both direct and collateral attack, or will it
make them only voidable by direct attack under appropri-
ate procedure during the joint lives of the contracting par-
ties?"+ A consideration of Maryland legal history with
reference to marriage impediments15 indicates that this is
no mere pedantic query. For instance, the plain word
"void" in the statute on inter-marriage of near relatives
has been judicially interpreted to mean only voidable by
action during the joint lives of the parties.16 It would be
no greater stretch of the imagination to limit "it shall be
unlawful" to merely imposing criminal penalties, rather
than affecting the validity of the marriage.17
The tendency of the Maryland court to uphold mar-
riages whenever possible' s or, by ruling for voidability
"The criminal penalties of the new statute are set out herein, supra
n. 2.
"' For a treatment of the problem of "void or voidable" with reference
to the earlier Maryland law of marriage age, see the article cited, supra
n. 7, 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 233.
" See the whole article, Ibid, for a survey of the problem in its
entirety.
"Harrison v. State, Use of Harrison, 22 Md. 468, 85 Am. Dec. 658
(1864), interpreting Md. Code, Art. 62, Secs. 1, 2.
"7 Consider that, on another occasion when the legislature set up an
impediment to marriage, it made it clear that it did intend the statute
to go to the validity of marriages. Thus, In the miscegenation statute,
Md. Code Supp., Art. 27, See. 365, marriages between persons of the differ
ing and prohibited races are said to be "forever prohibited, and void."




rather than voidness,' to minimize the effect of defect in
marriage, would help to indicate that the answer to the
major query of this comment should be that the statute
does not make the forbidden marriages void, but rather
makes them, at worst, only voidable by proceeding and,
perhaps, not even that, but completely valid, although the
parties and their guilty accessories may be criminally pun-
ishable.
This last would seem to be the most decent and socially
desirable answer for the typical case, i. e., where by
perjury as to age the parties improperly secure a license,
go through a religious ceremony, and live together as hus-
band and wife. It would be monstrous to say that such a
marriage could later be attacked, directly or collaterally,
or the legitimacy of the issue impugned. Rather, the bet-
ter answer seems to be that, as under the older 18-21 stat-
ute, the forbidden marriage is valid, although the parties
are punishable.
It is regrettable that the statute was not more carefully
drafted so as to give a clear answer as to the legislative
intent on the point under discussion. 20 The known2 ' exist-
ence of the analogous problem under the older 18-21 years
statute should have called attention to the need for explicit
solution of it in the new one.
LIABILITY OF RAILROAD TO INTRUDERS
CROSSING ITS RIGHT OF WAY
Jackson v. Pennsylvania R. Co.'
Plaintiff-appellant sought to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries sustained when he was struck by a train of
defendant-appellee. The injuries were alleged to have been
received at night at a point where defendant-appellee's
tracks, which border a public thoroughfare in a thickly set-
tled community in Baltimore County, were traversed by a
" Ibid; and consider also the Harrison case, supra n. 16.
20 Consider also the fault in the statute pointed out supra n. 3; and
the further point that the statutory provision withholding from the record
the certificate of pregnancy (in the exceptional situation under Section
7) is a futile one in view of the fact that it will be obvious that pregnancy
exists from the fact that the license issues to one under the statutory
minimum age.
21 As witness the discussion of the point in the REvIEW in 1937 and 1938
in the casenote and article cited, supra n. 7.
'3 A. (2d) 719, 120 A. L. R. 1068 (Md. 1939).
344 [VOL. III
